I Introduction
In July 2007, when the recent crisis on credit markets was about to begin, Chuck Prince, then chief executive of Citigroup, told the Financial Times:
1 "When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing." This quote can serve as a fitting description for two aspects that many observers think are typical for financial markets. First, agents tend to behave like other market participants or, using a technical term, their strategies are strategic complements. Second, the behaviour that the agents coordinate on might depend on outside signals. Like a piece of music played to a group of people, such signals should be observable by all agents, and all agents should be aware of this fact; in short, the signals should be common knowledge. For agents to behave in this way on financial markets appears, as the recent credit crisis suggests, suboptimal from a social point of view, and one reason for this is that agents might focus too much on the public signals and thus disregard valuable private information about the fundamental state of the economy. Such a reasoning was formalized by Morris and Shin (2002) : they showed that if the central bank has the option to publish information about the fundamental state of the economy as common knowledge, and coordination of agents is irrelevant for welfare, then it might be better not to publish information that might have the effect that private information about the state of the economy is neglected, because agents focus too much on public information in order to coordinate their behaviour. This paper argues that the stark alternative of either publishing public information or not is an oversimplification; if the information structure is formulated a bit richer and, as is argued here, in a more realistic way, important questions about what sort of information should be published arise. In particular, we assume that the central bank or, more generally, a public agency has specific information about the fundamental state of subsectors of the whole economy, and that it can communicate all of these pieces of information to the public, or just publish the overall assessment about the fundamental state of the economy or publish nothing. The first policy of communication is called transparent, the second opaque and the third secret. The transparent policy does not yield better common knowledge about the state of the overall economy than the opaque policy. However, a detailed account of the information which has led to an assessment by the public agency 1 In autumn 2007, large writedowns on commitments to lend made it clear that Citigroup had expanded its exposure to the credit markets for too long, and Mr Prince soon had to resign. makes the agents' private information about the economy more valuable. This is because each agent is an expert for a specific sector of the economy, and a detailed account from the agency gives valuable information to the agent about those sectors that they are not an expert in. One interesting result that can be derived from this framework is that private agents always place more weight on their private information with transparent communication than with opaque communication, although the latter gives less public information. The reason for this result is that transparent communication gives the agents a better chance of utilizing their own information. Thus, for a certain range of parameter values, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public signals might be to give more detailed information to the public instead of denying any access to the public information. From a welfare point of view, it can be shown that transparency is always better than opacity. However, if complementarities are strong and public information lacks precision, secrecy is best. Moreover, for an infinite number of sectors, transparent communication is equivalent to opacity and the model presented here reproduces the results of Morris and Shin (2002) .
The framework used in this paper is still quite simple: the overall economy is just the sum of all of the specific sectors. There are, however, real-world cases that resemble this very simple framework quite well. We give an example for opaque communication. The European Central Bank regularly publishes forecasts for growth and inflation in the euro area. These forecasts are, inter alia, derived from a euro-area-wide model, and from assessments for the single countries the euro area consists of; however, these assessments are not published. This paper is a contribution to the theory on the macroeconomic implications of higher-order beliefs in a global games context. A rich literature on this topic has evolved, starting with the seminal article of Morris and Shin (1998) . The result in their 2002 paper, that too much transparency of central banks might be detrimental, was met by objection of Svensson (2006) that the parameter range for which this result holds is quite special. In particular, the precision of information the central bank has must be lower than the precision of information from private sources. Indeed, this condition might not be plausible for forecasts of inflation by central banks that have excellent research departments such as, for example, the Federal Reserve Board. It is, however, far from clear whether this condition is fulfilled for central banks that are not so well equipped and for other variables that are, to a lesser extent, in the focus of central banks. Indeed, many contributions (see, e.g., Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2007) ) address the implications for the evaluation of assets. The paper that comes closest to our contribution is that of Gosselin et al. (2007) , because, similar to the paper at hand, it distinguishes between different degrees of transparency. Gosselin et al. add Morris and Shin (2007) assume that the central bank can either publish several pieces of information for experts or an overall assessment for the public, but not both. Lindner (2006) analyzes conditions for multiplicity of equilibria in a global games context that is similar to that presented here. Geraats (2006) gives an overview about theoretical and empirical aspects concerning the transparency of central banks. Crowe and Meade (2008) show that more central bank transparency is associated with more accurate private sector forecasts. Andersen et al. (2005) show that publications of macroeconomic news indeed have discernible effects on asset valuations on financial markets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II sets the framework. In Section III equilibrium strategies of private agents depending on the communication policy of the public agency are derived. Section IV compares the welfare effects of the different policies depending on the parameters of the model. Section V sums up and gives an outlook on possible future research.
II A formal framework
The basic model of the public agency's communication policies builds on the approach of Morris and Shin (2002) . It centres around a parameter Θ that represents the fundamental state of the economy. We might think of Θ as standing for the overall activity level of the economy. There is a continuum of agents of unit mass indexed by g ∈ [0; 1]. An agent g chooses her own activity level a g such that her utility function u g (a, Θ) is maximized:
with 0≤r < 1,
Equation (1) shows that agent g has an incentive to align their activity level a g to that of the fundamental state Θ. In addition, the agent benefits from aligning their action to those of the other agents (or from a "coordination" of actions), with (1 − r) and r as the factors that give the two parts of the utility function their respective weights. The second part implies an externality: if other agents are good in aligning their actions to each other (if L is low), agent g receives lower utility. Thus, this part of the utility function gives agents an incentive to play a zero-sum game that resembles the famous "beauty contest" that served Keynes (1936, Chapter 12) as a metaphor for modern stock market activities. Social welfare can be expressed by the normalized average of individual utilities:
Thus, a public agency that aims at maximizing social welfare should look for a communication policy that makes agents align their activity level to the fundamental state of the overall economy as closely as possible.
Parameter Θ is a catch-all variable for the fundamental state of the economy; it is equal to the sum of the activity levels θ i of the n sectors (n≥2) the economy consists of
Every agent g is an expert in one sector: an agent of type i is an expert in sector i. This means that they know the realization of the activity level of one sector i,θ i , with certainty. Experts are equally distributed over the sectors: 1/nth of all agents are experts for a sector i. It is common knowledge that the realizations of the activity levels in the single sectors are correlated in the same way.
2 In particular, an agent of type i knows that the realization of the fundamental state in a sector j is θ j =θ i + ε j , with ε j as an independent and identically distributed random variable with mean zero and variance 1/δ (precision δ), whose realization is not known by an agent of type i.
3 In the following, it suffices to identify an agent g just by their type i.
The public agency observes noisy signals x i =θ i +η i over the fundamental states of the single sectors, with η i as an independent and identically distributed random variable with mean zero and variance 1/γ (precision γ). Thus, while it is not as well informed as the agents are about their own sector, it has some valuable information about every sector of the economy. The agency can choose between three communication policies: the first is called transparent. Here, it publishes the detailed reasons for the overall assessment X, that is, making all x i and with them X = n i=1 x i common knowledge. The second policy is called opaque, because it publishes only its assessment X of the fundamental state of the overall economy. Third, the agency can be secret and publish no information at all.
Next we look at the equilibrium strategies of agents under the three different regimes of public communication.
III Equilibrium strategies of agents
An agent of type i minimizes their loss according to (1) by choosing the action a i :
with a as the average action of all agents 1 0 a h dh. The expected fundamental state of the economy E i (Θ) and the average action of other agents E i (a) expected by an agent of type i depend on the information published by the public agency.
III.1 The case of secrecy
If the agency does not publish any information, the aspect of strategic interaction vanishes: because everyone has only their private information, E i (Θ) = nθ i and E i (θ j =i ) =θ i . The optimal strategy a i,s (with the subscript s for secrecy) for an agent of type i is simply to align their activity level with their estimation of the fundamental state in the overall economy:
III.2 The case of transparent communication
The equilibrium can be found by the "guess and solve" method. First we take the hypothesis that, in equilibrium, the action a i,t (with the subscript t for the transparent case) of a type-i agent is a linear combination of the overall fundamental state expected by an agent of type i, E i (Θ), and of the overall fundamental state expected by the public agency X:
with the coefficient λ t as a still-to-be-determined function of the exogenous parameters of the model. An agent of type i knows that 1/nth of all agents have the same information set as the agent has. Under our hypothesis, and observing equation (4), the strategy of an agent i can be expressed as follows:
For transparent communication, E i (Θ) is given by
and
Inserting the expressions for expectations into equation (6) and collecting terms gives (see Appendix A for details)
Solving A(r, n, λ, γ, δ) = 1 −λ t and B =λ t both give the same result:
Thus, we have found the equilibrium of the game: if all other agents behave according to (5), it is optimal for an agent to use this strategy too.
5 The first two terms on the right equal E i (θ j ), and the following sum equals
The equilibrium has plausible properties: the more important it is for an agent to act in close alignment with other agents, the more closely the agent acts to the public signal concerning the state of the overall economy (∂λ t /∂r > 0 and λ t → 1 for r → 1). In addition, more precise public information γmeans that the public information is more important for the action of the agent (∂λ t /∂γ > 0), while the converse is true for the precision of private information (∂λ t /∂δ < 0). Moreover, if there are only a few sectors in the economy, the private information of an agent will help them to estimate the true fundamental state very well and this information will have a strong influence on their action. Accordingly, the larger the number of sectors n, the more important the public information is (∂λ t /∂n > 0). For an infinite number of sectors, we have
In this special case, the strategy of agents is identical to that found in Morris and Shin (2002) . 
III.3 The case of opaque communication
In the case of opaque communication, the public agency publishes only its overall assessment of the economy X. The "guess and solve" method works again, but this time with another hypothesis: in equilibrium, the action a i,o (with the subscript o for opacity) of a type-i agent is a linear combination of nθ i (this is the value of the overall fundamental state expected by the agent if they only had their private information and not the overall assessment of the agency) and of the overall fundamental state expected by the public agency X:
This means that the optimal strategy can be expressed as follows:
In order to find the expectation of an agent of type i about the overall economy and about other sectors, we first derive the expectation of agent i about the part of the economy they are not an expert in:
. This is the weighed average of the expectation value that comes from the public information and the expectation value coming from private knowledge, with the precisions of the two sources of information as weighing factors. The expectation on the basis of private information is given by (n − 1)θ i , and the precision is δ/(n − 1), because
The expectation of public information equals X −θ i , with precision γ/n, because
With these facts in mind, the expectation of type i about the part of the economy they are not an expert in can be calculated to be (see Appendix B)
and the expectation of type i about the overall economy is (see Appendix B)
Inserting these results into equation (11) (and noting that E i (θ j =i ) = E i (Θ −i )/(n−1)), rearranging according to (8), and solving for A(r, n, λ, γ, δ) = 1 −λ o and B =λ o , gives the following result for the equilibrium value of the optimal strategy parameter λ o for a representative agent in the case of opacity:
Again, as in the case of transparency, the more important that acting in close alignment with other agents is, the more closely the agent acts to the public signal concerning the state of the overall economy (∂λ o /∂r > 0 and λ o → 1 for r → 1). In addition, more precise public information γ means that the public information is more important for the action of the agent (∂λ o /∂γ > 0), while the converse is true for the precision of private information (∂λ o /∂δ < 0). Moreover, the larger the number of sectors n, the more important the public information is (∂λ o /∂n > 0).
III.4 Comparing equilibrium strategies in the case of transparency and opacity
The equilibrium strategies were shown to be linear combinations of the overall public information X and, in the case of transparency, of the value of the overall state expected by the representative agent E i (Θ) or, in case of opacity, of the private information the agents has, θ i . Thus, the values of the weights λ t and λ o are not directly comparable. What is comparable, however, are the weights with which the private information θ i enters into the activity parameter a i , W t (θ i ) and W o (θ i ). They can be calculated with help of equations (5), (7) and (9) for the transparent case and similarly for the opaque case and are given by
The following can be shown.
Proposition 1. For a finite number of sectors n, and for 0≤r < 1, the weight with which the private information θ i enters into the activity level a i is always larger in the case of a transparent communication policy than in case of an opaque communications policy:
Proof. See Appendix C.
For example, in the case of n = 2 sectors and γ=δ= 1 and r = 1/2, the weight of θ i is 1.2 for transparency and 1 for opacity.
7 Only for n → ∞ do the strategies become identical for the two cases: W (θ i ) = nδ(1−r)/(δ(1−r)+γ)). For r → 1, agents are solely interested in coordination and, for this objective, private information is useless.
At first glance, this result might be surprising because, in principle, a transparent communications policy gives more public information to the agents and, therefore, a natural guess might be that agents with more public information rely more heavily on it and less on private information than in the case of an opaque policy. The additional information in the case of transparency, however, does not make common knowledge X about the state of the overall economy Θ more precise, but it helps every single agent in better utilizing their private information in the estimation of Θ.
IV Welfare effects of different communication policies
Since the equilibrium strategies under different communication policies have now been derived, it is possible to analyze the welfare effects of these policies. As discussed in Section II, it is assumed in this paper that agents benefit from aligning their action to that of other agents only insofar as, similar to the beauty contest of Keynes (1936) , they do this better than average agents. Therefore, from a social point of view, only the benefit stemming from the first part of (1) enters into the welfare function (2) the public agency should maximize.
In the case of transparency, equation (2) becomes (see Appendix D)
Sensible properties of this welfare function can easily be checked for some limit cases: the loss that stems from agents not fully aligning their activity level to that of the overall economy decreases for higher-precision public information γor private information δ, and it vanishes for γ→ ∞ or δ→ ∞. The aspect of strategic interaction also vanishes if γor δare zero. In the first case, only the precision of private information matters for welfare (V t (a, Θ) = −(n−1)/δ); in the second, only the precision of public information is relevant (V t (a, Θ) = −n/γ). If agents were only interested in coordination (if r → 1), they would focus just on the public signal and welfare would only depend on γ: V t (a, Θ) = −n/γ.
In the case of opacity, equation (2) becomes (see Appendix E)
The results for the transparent case concerning γ→ ∞,δ→ ∞,γ= 0, δ= 0 and r → 1 also hold for opacity. For the case of r = 0, welfare is higher for transparency:
. This is not a surprising result, because there is no negative externality if agents are only interested in aligning their activity level to the fundamental state of the overall economy: in this case, giving more information to them is clearly welfare enhancing. However, it can be shown that the result holds in general.
Proposition 2. The transparent communication policy always leads to welfare that is at least as high as in the case of an opaque communication policy. Sufficient conditions for transparency leading to strictly higher welfare are r < 1,γ>0,δ>0 and n≥2.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Thus, as long as agents are not only interested in aligning their strategies with each other, it is not a good idea for the public agency to give opaque information. Instead, it is better to be transparent or, in some cases, to give no information at all: the welfare in the case of secrecy is
If coordination is very important to agents 8 , and if public information has quite poor precision γfor a given level of precision for private information δ, it might be better for the public agency to be secret in order to prevent agents from coordinating on a public signal that gives less information about the overall state of the economy than the private information of agents does. Figure 1 shows for which parameter values γand r which strategy is best for the case of n = 2 and δ= 1. For the area where V t > V s > V o , a communication policy that is opaque leads to agents attaching too much importance to public information, but the agency should not switch to secrecy and instead give more detailed information; this will enable agents to better utilize their private information. When there are more than two sectors, the border between the regions V t > V s > V o and V s > V t > V o is closer to the border between V t > V s > V o and V t > V o > V s , because V t is closer to V o : information about the fundamental state of specific sectors is less valuable for private agents, if their information about the sector they are experts in is less important for the fundamental state of the overall economy. If n approaches infinity, the region for which welfare under secrecy is lower than welfare under transparency but higher than welfare under opacity vanishes.
8 More exactly, a necessary condition is that r > 2 − √ 2 ≈ 0.58 for n = 2 or r > 0.5 for n → ∞. Derivations of these results are available from the author upon request. The introduction briefly addressed the argument of Svensson (2006) that the parameter range for which transparency is damaging in the model of Morris and Shin (2002) is not large. As our model resembles the Morris-Shin case for n → ∞, Svensson's point is even more valid in our context.
9 Choosing a different level for δchanges the scale of the γ-axis, but apart from that leaves the figure unchanged.
Welfare effects of communication strategies V t , V o , V s for n = 2 sectors and the precision of private information δ= 1.
V Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the welfare effects of different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of private agents are strategic complements. In our framework, a detailed account of the information which has led to the assessment of the public agency makes the agents' private information more valuable. A consequence is that private agents put more weight on their private information in the case of transparent communication than in the case of opaque communication, although the former gives more public information than the latter. Therefore, for a specific range of parameter values, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public signals in the case of opaque communication is to give more detailed information to the public instead of denying any access to public information. If, however, complementarities are strong and the precision of public information is low relative to the precision of private information, secrecy is best. Thus, opacity is always dominated by one or both of the other communication strategies.
Of course, the model presented is, for the sake of simplicity, so stylized that a number of ways to make it more realistic come to mind. We mention just three of them. First, it may be worth analyzing what happens to an optimal communication policy if several public agencies with separate information exist and if they face coordination problems. Second, if monetary policy actions were included in the analysis, opacity might help central banks to reach their objectives of, for example, stabilizing output variation (see Gersbach 2003) .
Finally, it would be nice if a central assumption of our approach, namely that agents want to coordinate their action but that this coordination is not welfare enhancing, could be derived explicitly from some market failure. The basic argument of this paper, however, should still hold in a more complex setting: a more transparent information policy makes the private information of agents more valuable.
Appendices
A Exact form of equation (8) The exact form of equation (8) is given by
B Deriving E i (Θ −i ) and E i (Θ)
As to E i (Θ −i ), the weighed average of the expectation value that comes from the public information and the expectation value relying on private knowledge is given by
Rearrangement and simplification yield equation (12) . From this it is easy to derive E i (Θ), because E i (Θ) = E i (Θ −i ) +θ i
C Proof of Proposition 1
For W o (θ i ) − W t (θ i ) we obtain, after rearranging, We express the welfare function (2) as that part of the expected utility function of type i that is welfare relevant, −E i (a i −Θ)
2 . Inserting equations (5) and (9) Note that θ j =i =θ i + ε j and x j =θ j +η j . Therefore, V t (a, Θ) = −E γ+λ t δ δ+γ 
E Deriving the welfare function for opacity
The procedure is basically the same as for transparency. Inserting equations (10) and (13) 
F Proof of Proposition 2
We show that V o − V t < 0 for r < 1, γ>0, δ>0 and n≥2. Subtracting equation (14) As r < 1 and γ, n > 0 we have to show that Z > 0 for r < 1, γ>0, δ>0. For αwe have α= −n + n 2 + 2r − 3nr + n 2 r
It can be shown that α>0 for n≥2 and 0 < r < 1. As for β:
β= n(−1 − r + 3r 2 − r 3 + n(2 − 2r))
Again it can be shown that β>0 for n≥2 and 0 < r < 1. Finally, ζ= n 2 (1 − 3r + 3r 2 − r 3 )
It can easily be shown that (1 − 3r + 3r 2 − r 3 ) > 0 for 0 < r < 1. This completes the proof. Moreover, with the help of the equations given above, it is now easy to see that V o − V t ≤0 for n≥2 r≤1 even if δ= 0 or γ= 0.
